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ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY AFTER
MONELL-
IS THE SHIELD STILL INTACT?
by
Hunter W. Lundy*
Several recent United States Supreme Court decisions have caused
many to believe that the eleventh amendment immunity of states has
been eroded and that states are now susceptible to damage suits under
title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code.1 The primary basis for
these beliefs is the recent decision of Monell v. Department of Social
Services of New York.2
This comment will discuss Monell and how it and other decisions
have given rise to arguments that state immunity has been completely
abrogated in section 1983 suits. The comment will present the argu-
ments for both sides, encompassing a cursory review of many recent
decisions, in an effort to determine what the existing law is on the
question.
HAS ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY BEEN ABROGATED?
The Affirmative Argument
The foundation for the argument that section 1983 has abrogated
the immunity of states in damage suits was laid in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer.' The plaintiffs in Fitzpatrick brought a class action suit in be-
half of all present and retired male employees of the State of Con-
necticut. The plaintiffs alleged that certain provisions of Connecticut's
statutory retirement plan discriminated against them because of their
sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
The district court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor, awarding prospec-
tive injunctive relief against the defendant state officials. However, the
court denied an award of retroactive retirement benefits and attor-
"B.B.A. 1976, Millsaps College; J.D. 1980, Mississippi College School of Law; Law
Clerk for the Honorable Walter L. Nixon, Jr., United States District Court, Southern
District of Mississippi.
'Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
'436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
'427 U.S. 445 (1976).
'Id. at 445.
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neys' fees saying that such would constitute a recovery of money dam-
ages from the state's treasury, an act precluded by the eleventh
amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit remanded the case on the question of attorneys' fees saying that
such an award would have little effect on the state treasury.
5
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the United States Supreme Court,
stated that Title VII allowed suits for damages against the states, re-
gardless of the eleventh amendment immunity.' Hence, the plaintiffs
were entitled to both back pay and attorneys' fees. He expressed that
when Congress passes laws for the purpose of fourteenth amendment
enforcement, such as Title VII, suits by individuals against states, pur-
suant to these laws, will be permissible.' This rule was further empha-
sized by the Court in Hutto v. Finney.' In Hutto, a group of prisoners
filed suit against the officials of the Arkansas prison system. The pris-
oners alleged that the conditions and treatment they were subject to
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments.' The district court found that the viola-
tions did exist and subsequently issued a series of remedial orders. On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
the prison officials challenged two aspects of the district court's relief,
the most significant being the awarding of attorneys' fees to be paid
out of department of correction funds."0 The court of appeals affirmed
and assessed additional attorneys' fees to cover the services on appeal."
The Supreme Court affirmed. 2
The Supreme Court opinion in Hutto, released just a few days after
Monell, reiterated that Congress "has plenary power to set aside State's
immunity ... in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."'" The
Court in Hutto disregarded the bar of the eleventh amendment only
as to attorneys' fees and costs. Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring
opinion asserted that the rule of Edelman v. Jordan4 had been eroded
by Fitzpatrick and Monell and therefore the Court should also award
damages against the states.
15
A significant requirement under the express terms of section 1983 is
that the defendant must be a "person"; 6 however, the Supreme Court
elected to redefine the word "person" in Monell. In July of 1971, a
'519 F.2d 559, 571-72 (2nd Cir. 1975).
'427 U.S. at 457.
'id. at 456.
'437 U.S. 678 (1978).
'Id. at 678.
"0548 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1977).
lid. at 742-43.
"437 U.S. at 700.
'lId. at 693 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445).
"415 U.S. 651 (1974), affg Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
"437 U.S. at 700-01 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"See note 1, supra.
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group of female employees of the New York Department of Social
Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York filed
a class action suit under section 1983, alleging that the Department
and the Board, as a matter of policy, forced pregnant employees to
take unpaid leaves of absence before the leaves were required for
medical reasons."1 The plaintiffs sought both injunctive and monetary
relief. The defendants were the Board of Education and its chancellor,
the department of social services and its commissioner, and the City of
New York and its mayor. The individual defendants were sued in their
official capacities only."8
Prior to trial, the defendants changed their maternity leave policy,
an act which resulted in plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declara-
tory relief becoming moot. The district court dismissed the case in its
entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court stated that
any damage award would ultimately have to come from the City of
New York, an action which would be precluded by municipal immu-
nity under Monroe v. Pape.9
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that Monroe did not extend to pub-
lic entities such as the Board of Education, and that a damage award
could be granted against the individual defendants who were persons
within the meaning of section 1983. ° The court of appeals found that
the Board was not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983 and
that Monroe prohibits a damage award against individual defendants
sued in their official capacity because such a judgment would have to
be satisfied out of public funds.2"
The Supreme Court, however, re-examined the legislative history of
section 198322 and held that a municipality is a "person," and, thus,
overruled Monroe insofar as it had held that local governments were
wholly immune from suits under section 198.23 After analyzing the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court concluded
that Congress had always intended for municipalities and other local
government bodies to be included among those persons to whom sec-
tion 1983 applies. Furthermore, the Court said that municipalities and
other local governmental units were subject to suit under 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief when the action alleged to
be unconstitutional "implements or executes a policy statement, ordi-
nance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
'"436 U.S. at 661.
'Id.
"365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court in Monroe stated that it did not believe that the
word "person" as used in the act was intended to include a municipality. Id. at 191.
'p532 F.2d 259 (2nd Cir. 1976).
"Id. at 264-265.
t2 Both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 originated from § I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. They were later separated for the purpose of codification.
U436 U.S. at 700-01.
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the body's officers."'" The Court then went a step further and said that
the heart of a section 1983 action "is an allegation that official policy
is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitu-
tion . 2. 5 Local governments, like other 1983 "persons" could be sued
pursuant to an allegation of unconstitutional deprivations caused by
governmental custom.28 Also, the Court said the custom does not neces-
sarily have to be one that has been formally approved by the govern-
mental bodies.'
The Court did note, however, that the legislative history revealed
that Congress "did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
action pursuant to an official municipal policy of some nature caused a
constitutional tort."28 Specifically, the Court concluded that a munici-
pality could not be held liable if it only employs a tortfeasor-or, in
other words, a municipality would not be liable under section 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory.29
The Monell limitation of the respondeat superior theory was re-
cently followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Baskin v. Parker.3" The plaintiffs in Baskin filed suit against
the sheriff and deputy of Winn Parish, Louisiana. The plaintiffs al-
leged that they suffered damages due to an illegal and unreasonable
search of their property."' The district court awarded damages against
the deputy only. The facts revealed that the deputy sheriff obtained
warrants to search the Baskin properties for marijuana. The deputy,
however, lacked probable cause to obtain the warrants because his in-
formants were not credible." The informants had personal grievances
against the Baskins. There was evidence that the sheriff knew of this
before the warrant was obtained and yet he participated in the obtain-
ing of the warrant. Furthermore, the group conducting the search met
in the sheriff's office prior to approaching the plaintiffs' property. In
discussing Monell, the court of appeals stated that although the sheriff
could not be liable for damages for his deputy's actions under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior or under Louisiana's vicarious liability
laws, there was a question of whether the sheriff could be personally
liable for damages because of his participation in obtaining the war-
rants and organizing the search party.3 The case was reversed and
remanded."4
'ld. at 690.
"id.
"id. at 691.
rid.
"Id.
"Id.
"602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979).
lid. at 1205.
"Id. at 1207. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
"Id. at 1208.
uld. at 1211.
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Recalling the Court's conclusion in Monell, it is noted that the
Court did not decide whether local municipalities would be afforded
some official immunity. The Court stated that local municipalities
would not be afforded absolute immunity under 1983 but it failed to
draw lines as to the scope of municipal immunity."5
Monell states that Congress in enacting section 1983 as section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, intended to include within the term "per-
son" municipal corporations"0 and any entity which comes within the
term "body politic and corporate."" The legislative history, the Su-
preme Court held, indicates that "Congress, in enacting § 1, intended
to give a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil
rights.""8 "An examination of the debate on § 1 and application of
appropriate rules of construction show unequivocally that § 1 was in-
tended to cover legal as well as natural persons."39 The Court stated
that the debates themselves showed that Congress understood "per-
sons" to include municipal corporations.' Furthermore, the Court said
that contemporary judicial decisions show that in the year of the stat-
ute's enactment, 1871, it was well understood that corporations should
be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional
and statutory analysis.' In concluding its analysis of the legislative his-
tory, the Court noted that the word "person" included municipalities
as defined under the Dictionary Act passed prior to the Civil Rights
Act.4" The Act provided that "in all acts hereafter passed... the word
person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate...
unless the context shows that such were intended to be used in a more
limited sense."' 3 The Court determined that the plain meaning of sec-
tion 1 of the Civil Rights Act included municipal corporations in the
phrase "bodies politic and corporate" and, therefore, local government
bodies were "persons" under the Act."
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Quern v. Jordan,5
reviewed the legislative history, as previously discussed, and expanded
"436 U.S. at 701. See also Owen v. City of Independence, 48 U.S.L.W. 4389 (1980).
The Court held that a municipality has no immunity from liability under § 1983 for
constitutional violations. A municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity based on
good faith of its officials.
Oid. at 690.
"Id. at 688 (citing Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394
(C.C.N.D. II!. 1873) (No. 10,336)).
OId. at 685.
Old. at 683.
"Id. at 686.
'Id. at 687.
"Act of February 25, 1871, § 2 (16 Stat. 431). See also Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v.
Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1973) (No. 10,336).
"Act of February 25, 1871, § 2 (16 Stat. 431). See 436 U.S. at 688.
"436 U.S. at 688-89.
"440 U.S. 332, 350-66 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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his argument previously made in Hutto. Although he concurred with
the majority holding in Quern, he patently disagreed with the major-
ity that a state is not a "person" for the purposes of section 1983.46 He
stated that the Court's address of this issue in Quern was mere dicta. 7
He reviewed the Monell discussion of the Dictionary Act, insofar as it
held that "[s]ince there is nothing in the 'context' of the Civil Rights
Act calling for a restricted interpretation of the word 'person,' the lan-
guage of that section should prima facie be construed to include 'bod-
ies politic' among the entities that could be sued."48 Pursuant to this
review, Mr. Justice Brennan expressed his opinion that the overwhelm-
ing undisputed authority was that in 1871 the phrase "bodies politic
and corporate" included states.49 In concluding his argument, he stated
that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 expressed
Congress's intention that "States themselves, as bodies corporate and
politic, should be embraced by the term 'person' in § 1 of the Act.""0
Mr. Justice Brennan's view has been supported by several law jour-
nals"' and by members of the profession. 2 One case in particular,
Aldredge v. Turlington,"3 demonstrates how the Court's decision in
Monell and Mr. Justice Brennan's arguments have influenced other
courts.
In Aldredge, District Judge William Stafford of the Northern Dis-
trict of Florida, denied a motion to dismiss made by a Florida state
official who was being sued for damages pursuant to section 1983
while acting in his official capacity. Judge Stafford, in reviewing the
legislative history of 1983, concluded that a state was a "person" with-
in the meaning of section 1983 and that the eleventh amendment did
not bar an award of damages from a state's treasury.'4
The district judge stated that the numerous federal court decisions
prior to Monell which held that states were not "persons" under sec-
tion 1983 had not reached that conclusion because a special status had
been conferred on the states by the Constitution." Rather, courts had
proceeded on the assumption that if a municipality was not a "per-
son," then a state could not be deemed a "person." "As expressed in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer... 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had been held in Monroe v.
"Id. at 350-51.
"4Id.
Ild. at 356 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 689-90 n.53).
Old.
'AId. at 357.
"See LeGette, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Claims Against States for Damages, 7 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 525 (1979); McBirney, Quern v. Jordan: A Misdirected Bar to Section 1983 Suits
Against States, 67 CAL. L. REV. 407 (1979).
"See Brief of Counsel objecting to Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate, Lindsey v. Mississippi, No. J78-0345(N) (S.D. Miss. filed Aug. 3, 1978).
'TCA 78-830 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 1978).
"Id. slip op. at 8.
"Id. at 6.
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Pape . . .to exclude cities and other municipal corporations from its
ambit; that being the case, it could not have intended to include States
as parties defendant.""6 Therefore, Judge Stafford concluded that there
was no reason why states should be treated any differently than local
governmental units under section 1988. In reaching the question of
eleventh amendment immunity, he stated that the principle an-
nounced in Fitzpatrick was controlling."1
Judge Stafford noted that the Monell Court stated that section 1988
was passed by Congress to enforce the fourteenth amendment. Al-
though Edelman held that states are immune from suit under the elev-
enth amendment in a section 1983 action, it is explained in Fitzpatrick
that the basis for the decision in Edelman was that states and their
agencies were not at that time proper defendants under section 1983.'
Since it has now been held that states and their agencies are proper
defendants under 1983 suits, the eleventh amendment will no longer
prohibit suits."9
It is significant to note that although Judge Stafford ruled that
states, state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity
are "persons" under section 1988, the defendant, Turlington, was dis-
missed in his official capacity.6 The Fifth Circuit in Bogard v. Cook,"
had ruled that Monell was limited to local governmental units and did
not abrogate eleventh amendment immunity to states."' Applying Bo-
gard, Judge Stafford entered an order sua sponte setting aside his pre-
vious ruling and thus dismissing the state official Turlington from the
suit.
The Eleventh Amendment Shield Intact
The eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.
Although the eleventh amendment specifically bars only suits
against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits brought by its
own citizens as well as by citizens from other states.6 It is well settled
"Id. (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452). See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 351.
"Id. at 7-8.
"427 U.S. at 452.
"TCA 78-830, slip op. at 6.
OId. at 1.
61586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978).
"Id. at 410.
"Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974);
Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v.
1980]
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that a state is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution or
the acts of Congress."' Therefore, since a state is not a citizen, no diver-
sity of citizenship can exist between a state and any other party. 5
To fall within the confines of the defense of eleventh amendment
immunity, a state need not be named as a party defendant if the state
is, in fact, the real party in interest." The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in deciding whether eleventh amendment immunity is applica-
ble has placed strong emphasis upon whether a named party has been
treated as an "agency" or "alter ego ''6 1 of the state by the state
courts."'
In the early part of this century, the Court realized that the needs
of injured claimants should be cared for, irrespective of state immuni-
ty. This realization was first seen in the Court's decision in Ex parte
Young.6" In Young a group of railroad stockholders sued Minnesota
state officials in federal court seeking equitable relief from an alleged
unconstitutional confiscatory tax statute.70 The Minnesota Attorney
General raised the defense of eleventh amendment immunity."' The
Court concluded that injunctive relief should be granted against the
state officer, not in his official capacity, but as an individual since a
state officer who seeks to carry out an unconstitutional act is
"stripped" of his official capacity.
7 2
In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana" the
Terminal By. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47 (1944); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890). See also Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399.
"Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972).
"Skandia American Reinsurance Corp. v. Schenck, 441 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
See also Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. United States, 155 U.S. 482 (1894). The Supreme
Court stated in Postal Telegraph that:
A state is not a citizen. And, under the Judiciary Acts of the United States, it is
well settled that a suit between a State and a citizen or a corporation of another
State is not between citizens of different States; and that the Circuit Court of the
United States has no jurisdiction of it, unless it arises under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States.
Id. at 487.
"See Dacy v. Florida Bar, Inc., 414 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S.
909 (1970); Krisel v. Duran, 386 F.2d 179 (2nd Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042
(1968).
"Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Alabama State Docks Dep't, 415 F.2d 452,
455 (5th Cir. 1969).
"See Building Engineering Services Co. v. State of Louisiana, 459 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.
La. 1978); Usury v. Louisiana Dep't of Highways, 459 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. La. 1978);
Edward E. Morgan Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 212 Miss. 504, 54 So. 2d 742 (1951).
"209 U.S. 123 (1908).
1*Id. at 129.
"Id. at 132.
71Id. at 159-60, 168.
"323 U.S. 459 (1945).
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plaintiff brought suit against the Department of Treasury of the State
of Indiana and the state's governor, treasurer and auditor for a refund
of taxes alleged to have been collected illegally. 4 In reviewing the alle-
gations the Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff had failed to assert
a claim for a personal judgment against the individual defendants for
the contested tax payments. 5 The Court noted that the plaintiff's
claim was for a tax refund and not for imposition of personal liability
on the individual defendants for collecting the taxes illegally. The
Court concluded that the State of Indiana was the real party in inter-
est, since the recovery of any money would come from the state.
Therefore, in the absence of the state's consent, the suit was barred by
the eleventh amendment.7"
A number of years after Young and Ford Motor Co., the United
States Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan,77 further defined the test
for determining the application for eleventh amendment immunity-a
test which is evidently the law today.7"
Jordan filed a complaint under section 1983 in federal court in Illi-
nois, individually and as a representative of a class seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against two former directors of the Illinois De-
partment of Public Aid, the director of the Cook County Department
of Public Aid, and the comptroller of Cook County.79 He alleged that
these state officials were administering the federal-state programs in a
manner inconsistent with various federal regulations and in violation
of the fourteenth amendment. The district court issued a permanent
injunction requiring compliance with federal time limits and also or-
dered state officials to remit the wrongfully withheld benefits to all
persons who were found eligible. The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed.8"
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit on the
award of retroactive benefits.8 " The Court made it apparent that in an
action against a state pursuant to section 1983, a federal court's reme-
dial power, consistent with the eleventh amendment, is limited to pro-
spective injunctive relief. The Court also recognized that an action
may be barred by the eleventh amendment even if the state is not
named as a party to the action, if the judgment will have to be paid
from public funds in the state treasury.82 (Emphasis added.)
41d. at 460.
"i1d. at 464.
761d.
"1415 U.S. 651, affg Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985.
"Edelman has not been overruled by Fitzpatrick, Monell, nor Hutto. Furthermore, it
was cited as controlling in Quern.
'"415 U.S. at 653.
'"Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 9K5 (7th Cir. 1973).
"415 U.S. at 659.
'lid. at 663.
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The Court in a footnote 3 to Monell, emphatically stated that its
holding was "limited to local government units which are not consid-
ered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.''84 For some
unapparent reason, Mr. Justice Brennan in reaching his conclusions
about the application of section 1983 has elected to rely on the Monell
Court's analysis of the legislative history of the section, but has refused
to give weight to the Court's comment in note fifty-four. Contrary to
Mr. Justice Brennan's beliefs, federal courts have subsequently cited
footnote fifty-four as representing the Monell Court's intentions.85
This restriction on Monell was noted by the Fifth Circuit Court in
Bogard."8 Bogard, a former prisoner at Parchman Penitentiary in Mis-
sissippi, filed suit pursuant to section 1983 against various supervisory
officials, employees, and inmates at Parchman to recover damages for
personal injuries." He had been subjected to a series of corporal pun-
ishments and had suffered two incidents of prison violence, one that
had left him a permanent paraplegic.88 The district court directed a
verdict in favor of the prison officials, holding, that the eleventh
amendment barred a judgment against the state.88 The Fifth Circuit
Court affirmed.8 In discussing the question of immunity, the Fifth
Circuit stated:
The plaintiff contends that the recent Supreme Court decision in Mon-
ell... had abrogated the state's eleventh amendment immunity when it
is sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nothing in Monell, however, goes
that far. The Supreme Court explicitly noted that its Monell holding
was 'limited to local government units which are not considered part of
the state for eleventh amendment purposes.'. .. Monell did not discuss
Edelman v. Jordan and did not overrule it."1
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation in Bogard was applied by a Texas
federal court in Zaragoza v. City of San Antonio.92
In Zaragoza, the plaintiff brought suit pursuant to title 42, sections
1981, 1983, 1985 and title 28, section 1343 of the United States Code
alleging personal injuries from police brutality. 3 A motion to dismiss
was filed by the defendants, the City of San Antonio, the mayor and
"436 U.S. at 690 n.54.
841d.
"See, e.g., 440 U.S. at 338-39.
586 F.2d 399, 410.
'lid. at 401.
mid.
"405 F. Supp. 1202, 1208 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
9586 F.2d at 421.
"Id. at 410.
"464 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
mId. at 1163.
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chief of police and members of the city council. In granting the dis-
missal the district court stated:
This court is mindful of the recent Opinion of Judge William
Stafford of the Northern District of Florida in Aldredge ... which I feel
overdevelops this 'action' to an extreme not contemplated by Monell
and goes so far as to hold that a 'State is a person within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that in such an action the Eleventh Amendment is
not a bar to a damage award payable from the State Treasury.' . . .
While I have the highest personal affection, respect and admiration for
Judge Stafford, I disagree with his holding....
This Court believes the correct Opinion is expressed in Bogard ... 
Shortly after Monell the Supreme Court reviewed another section
1983 suit in Alabama v. Pugh." Pugh and other inmates of the Ala-
bama prison system sued the State of Alabama, the Alabama Board of
Corrections, and a number of other state officials responsible for the
administration of Alabama's prisons." The suit alleged that conditions
in Alabama prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.97 The district court
agreed and issued an order prescribing measures designed to end the
conditions. 8 The Fifth Circuit affirmed but modified some aspects of
the order."
The Supreme Court, however, reversed stating that there was "no
doubt" that the suit was barred by the eleventh amendment unless the
state had consented. 1'"
In March of 1979, the Supreme Court in Quern eliminated all
doubt on the question of eleventh amendment immunity of states in
section 1983 suits. Quern was a sequel to Edelman which had held, as
discussed above, that the eleventh amendment barred an award from a
state treasury of back welfare benefits wrongfully withheld by state
officials.1 'O The Edelman Court had specifically limited relief under
section 1983 to prospective injunctive relief,'0 2 disallowing any retroac-
tive compensation that would come from the state treasury." 3 Relying
on the remand order in Edelman, the district court in Quern ordered
the state officials to send each member of the plaintiff class a notice
informing them that they had been wrongfully denied public assis-
"Id. at 116,5.
"438 U.S. 781.
mid. at 781.
"
71d.
"P~ugh v. Locke, 406 F. Stipp. 318, 331-32 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
"Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 292 (5th Cir. 1977), affg, Pugh v. Locke, 406
F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
'"438 U.S. at 782.
'"440 U.S. at 337.
'"415 U.S. at 677.
'"id.
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tance.'0 4 An application for an administrative hearing was to be en-
closed with the notice. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, found that this proposed form of notice was barred by
the eleventh amendment, since it attempted to decide that state funds
would be used to satisfy claims without the consent of the state
through its appropriate officials. 5 The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's order.' It stated that on remand the district court
could order state officials to mail the plaintiff class a similar notice
advising them that the state's administrative procedure was available if
they desired to have the state determine whether each was eligible for
past benefits.0 7 The Illinois state officials appealed.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the Seventh Circuit, determined
that the notice simply apprised the plaintiff class members of their
available administrative procedures."0 8 The Court noted that its holding
was not an award of retroactive benefits prohibited by Edelman, since
the determination of retroactive benefits would be decided by the
state, its agencies and courts, and not the federal court. 9
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said that neither the
legislative history nor cases subsequent to Edelman cast any doubt on
Edelman's holding that section 1983 does not abrogate the eleventh
amendment immunity of states."' The Court, being fully aware of Mr.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Quern and Hutto, stated that
"unlike our Brother BRENNAN, we simply are unwilling to believe, on
the basis of such slender 'evidence,' that Congress intended by the gen-
eral language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity
of the States.""'
Quern was recently relied on by two cases before the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. In Lindsey v.
Mississippi,"2 the plaintiff, a black woman, alleged that she had been
unlawfully discriminated against and that her employment was unlaw-
10405 F. Supp. at 809 (1975).
1-440 U.S. at 335 (citing 563 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1977)).
1563 F.2d at 878.
'"'Id, at 875.
10440 U.S. at 349.
"'Id. at 347.
"'Id. at 345. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Rehnquist also wrote the opinion
for the court in Fitzpatrick. In that opinion he stated that the language of Title VII
constituted an express statutory waiver of state immunity, but that Congress never in-
tended for § 1983 to be a waiver.
"Id. at 341. However, a state official is a person under § 1983. Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974); Rochester v. White, 503 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1974). As established in
this comment, state agencies are considered to be arms of the state, and, therefore,
should not be considered a "person" within § 1983. See Edelberg v. Illinois Racing
Board, 540 F.2d 279, 281 n.2 (7th Cir. 1976).
"'See Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Objections to Report and
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate at 5, Lindsey v. Mississippi, No. J78-
0345(N) (S.D. Miss. filed Aug. k 1978).
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fully terminated. The defendants were the State of Mississippi, Gover-
nor Cliff Finch, the Mississippi Research and Development Center, the
director, the Mississippi Research and Development Council, the Board
of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning, the Mississippi Classifi-
cation Commission and its director. The plaintiffs in Cormier v. Es-
tess"5 charged the state, Pike County, its sheriff's department and the
Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center in a wrongful death ac-
tion allegedly attributable to their negligence. In both cases, District
Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. dismissed the State of Mississippi on the
basis that the state was not a 'person" under section 1983.""
THE APPARENT SCOPE OF
"PERSONS" UNDER SECTION 1983
It is asserted from the above discussion that a state may not be a
"person" under section 1983."' This portion of the comment will sum-
marily analyze who the courts have allowed as "persons" under the
section.
The eleventh amendment does not bar actions against state officials
who are charged with violating a person's constitutional rights under
color of state law. This rule was reinforced in Scheuer v. Rhodes.""
The plaintiffs in Scheuer were the personal representatives of the
three students who died in the episode occurring at Kent State Univer-
sity during May, 1970. The plaintiffs brought an action for damages
under section 1983 against the governor, adjutant general and his assis-
tant, various named and unnamed officers and enlisted members of
the Ohio National Guard and the president of Kent State University."'
The plaintiffs alleged that these officials, acting under color of state
law, "intentionally, recklessly, willingfully and wantonly""' caused an
unnecessary National Guard deployment on the Kent State University
campus and ordered the guard members to perform allegedly illegal
acts resulting in the students' deaths."9
The district court dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction,
because the action was, in effect, against the State of Ohio, and, thus,
barred by the eleventh amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 '
"'Cormier v. Estess, No. J79-0368(N) (S.D. Miss. 1980).
"'Lindsey v. Mississippi, No. J78-0345(N) (S.D. Miss. filed Aug. 3, 1978) (order dis-
missing State of Mississippi and its agencies granted Sept. 28, 1979); Cormier v. Estess,
No. J79-0368(N) (S.D. Miss. 1980) (order dismissing State of Mississippi granted Nov. 26,
1979).
"'Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332.
"s416 U.S. 232 (1974), affg Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972). See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123.
"'Id. at 234.
1"d, at 235.
1I1d.
1-471 F.2d 430, 443 (6th Cir. 1972).
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the eleventh amendment
does not in some circumstances bar an action for damages against a
state official charged with depriving a person of a federal right under
color of state law;' furthermore, the Court held that immunity of of-
ficers of the executive branch of a state government for their acts is
not absolute, but qualified and of a varying degree, depending upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the particular office and
the circumstances existing at the time of the challenged action. 2 ' The
Court also noted that the eleventh amendment's applicability "is to be
determined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by the
essential nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the
entire record."'
2 3
The rule in Scheuer was recently followed in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Cruz v. Beto.'2' Twelve prisoners of the Texas Department
of Corrections and their attorney, Cruz, instituted the action pursuant
to section 1983, asserting that the defendant, a former director of the
Texas Department of Corrections, had unlawfully interfered with the
plaintiffs' attorney-client relationship.2  The district court entered an
injunction against further violations and awarded money damages
against the defendant. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that al-
though Beto was a state official with qualified immunity, this immuni-
ty was stripped because of his bad faith action in interfering with the
prisoners' attorney-client relationship.
2 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed
this rule in West v. Keve'2 ' when it held that damage suits against state
officials in their individual capacities are not barred by the eleventh
amendment. 12 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant prison officials
had shown indifference to his serious medical need by denying him
adequate medical treatment. The appeals court stated that although
the eleventh amendment bars damage suits against state officials in
their official capacities when damages will be paid out of state funds,
it does not bar damage claims against state officials in their individual
capacities. 129
In Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle 31 the Supreme Court
expressed much of the same reasoning that it subsequently stated in
Monell. The suit evolved from the school board's failure to renew
2'416 U.S. at 238.
'id. at 244-45.
'"'ld. at 237 (citing Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921)).
603 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1979).
"'lld. at 1180.
'
2 Id. at 1186.
571 F.2d 158,(3rd Cir. 1978). See also, Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of
Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HAli\'. L. Ri.w. 610 (1979).
"lId. at 163.
"'Id.
'429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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Doyle's teaching contract. Although the Court found that jurisdiction
had been pleaded under title 28, section 1331 and not section 1983, it
did address the question of the board of education's eleventh amend-
ment immunity.' The Court stated that the question of immunity was
dependent on whether the board of education was to be treated as an
arm of the State of Ohio or was to be treated as a municipal corpora-
tion to which the eleventh amendment does not apply."2 The Court
concluded that since school districts were included as political subdivi-
sions, and political subdivisions were not included as arms of the state,
the school board was more like a county or city than an arm of the
state, and thus, was not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity.'3 3
In summary, it would be reasonable to assume that neither a state
nor a state agency would be a "person" under section 1983."" Also, it
is reasonable to state that no state boards, such as a parole 31 or prison
board," will be considered "persons" under 1983.1
37
The scope of 1983, in regard to who will be "persons," however,
should include counties, cities, municipalities, and entities thereof.
Also, state officials sued in their individual and official capacities will
be considered as "persons" for purposes of the section. As stated pre-
viously in Fitzpatrick and Hutto, Congress may authorize by statute
others to be included within the ambit of the "persons" designation.
CONCLUSION
The Court's analysis of the legislative history of section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in Monell, accompanied by
Mr. Justice Brennan's argument, have implanted serious doubts in
many minds as to whether states should be excluded as "persons" un-
der section 1983. Fitzpatrick and Hutto, furthermore, have empha-
sized Congress's power to disregard eleventh amendment immunity
when passing federal laws for the purpose of fourteenth amendment
enforcement. However, in spite of the implications of Monell, Fitzpa-
trick, and Hutto, the Court has found the roots of the eleventh amend-
ment well planted and has ruled that states themselves are still im-
mune from section 1983 damage suits.
In recent years the Court has had more than ample opportunity to
"'Id. at 279.
'"Id. at 280. See also Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
'Id.
'See Edelberg v. Illinois Racing Board, 540 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1976).
'"See Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1977); Bricker v. Michigan Parole
Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
'"See note 128, supra.
'See generally Martinez v. California, 48 U.S.L.W. 4076 (1980). In this case the ap-
pellants' decedent was murdered by a parolee. Action by the parents was brought under
state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court held that the girl's death was too remote
from the parole officers' action to hold the state liable under federal civil rights law.
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review the legislative history of section 1983 and it has rejected Mr.
Justice Brennan's argument on numerous occasions. In all of the recent
cases, the Court recognized Edelman as the controlling rule. In Monell
the Court specifically stated that its opinion was limited to local mu-
nicipalities which are not considered part of the state for eleventh
amendment purposes.
Allegations that the Court's discussion of this issue in Quern was
mere dicta are clearly erroneous. The crux of Quern was the discussion
of eleventh amendment immunity and its effects on section 1983. Fur-
thermore, the Court since Edelman has decided no case that would
change the immunity of states in actions filed pursuant to section
1983.
It might be said that the Court's opinion in Monell rekindled a fire
for those seeking to hold states liable in section 1983 suits. This fire,
however, has undoubtedly been extinguished by later Court decisions.
